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Introduction  
Insurgent conflicts are conspicuously at the center of today’s international security landscape. 
After decades of neglect, the U.S. military has spent the last few years feverishly trying to relearn 
some of the counterinsurgent lessons from its past. Arguably the most discussed lesson concerns 
the ultimate “prize” in insurgent conflicts—winning the hearts and minds of an indigenous 
population. In Iraq, increasing attention has focused on how to improve our politico-military 
policies in an effort to garner the support of Iraqis. However, Iraq also reminds us of another 
critical lesson from our past—the role and impact external supporters can have vis à vis 
successful insurgencies. As Jeffrey Record of the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College points out, 
during the Vietnam War the North Vietnamese, “among the most tenacious and skilled enemies 
the United States has ever fought, could hardly have prevailed unarmed, which is how they would 
have had to fight absent the massive Soviet and Chinese assistance they in fact received.”[1] He 
goes on to note that,  
North Vietnam, the political and military engine of the Communists war in Indochina, had no arms 
industry; it had to import even small arms and small-arms ammunition from the Soviet Union, 
China, and other Communist Bloc countries…Had the Vietnamese Communists been isolated 
from external assistance, as were their fellow Communist insurgents in Malaya and the 
Philippines in the latter 1940s and early 1950s, they almost certainly would have suffered the 
same fate: defeat.[2]  
While insurgencies are ultimately won or lost in the domestic political arena, successful efforts 
often depend on some measure of external support. The mere presence of such support does not 
guarantee an insurgent victory, but it can often provide the help an insurgency needs to turn the 
corner or sustain ongoing operations. Given the impact this variable has had on the outcome of a 
number of notable insurgencies from the past, including Vietnam, we must remind ourselves 
about how external support can affect insurgencies, but more importantly, what motivates 
external supporters to provide such assistance. By understanding an external supporter’s 
motivations, counterinsurgents can work to more effectively offset such support, which can 
bolster their chances of fostering an acceptable outcome. As such, the U.S. should reevaluate its 
operating assumptions concerning Iran’s support of the Iraqi insurgency, in order to improve its 
prospects for the long-term stabilization of Iraq and the region.  
Understanding the Role and Impact of External Supporters 
External support can come in the form of moral, political, or material assistance, from a number of 
places, including states, Diasporas, refugees, and non-state actors (i.e. non-governmental 
organizations).[3] From the Tamil Diaspora to Al-Qaeda, different types of external supporters 
have impacted a number of insurgent conflicts as of late. Notwithstanding the growing influence 
that these types groups can have, particularly in a post Cold War environment, the fact remains 
that the material support provided by states is the most influential type of external support an 
insurgency can receive. The role and impact external states have had on insurgencies like the 
American Revolution, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet-Afghan War speaks for itself. While other 
types of support and supporters have impacted various modern conflicts, no similar combination 
has been as instrumental in contributing to insurgent victories.  
This combination is significant for two reasons: first, external states are typically in the best 
position to provide the high levels of material support an insurgency craves, in the form financing, 
supplies, and armaments. During the American Revolution, only a state like France could have 
consistently provided Washington’s army with the amount of “gold, clothing, and cannons” he 
needed to engage the British army.[4] Second, given the relative capabilities of states, external 
state supporters are uniquely positioned to coordinate and provide for the advanced types of 
material support that insurgents cannot readily obtain from anywhere else, including intelligence, 
training, and relevant technology. Hezbollah’s de-facto victory over Israel in the summer of 2006 
was largely attributable to Iranian support in the form advanced military training, anti-tank 
weaponry, and Katyusha rockets.[5]  
The Bush Administration has long been concerned about Iranian support for the Iraqi insurgency. 
It has said that Iran is providing military, financial, and operational support to the insurgency.[6] 
The bipartisan Iraq Study Group reported “ Iran has provided arms, financial support, and training 
for Shiite militias within Iraq.”[7] The current U.S. commander in Iraq, Army General David H. 
Petraeus, cited lengthy interrogations as having “revealed” that Iran has been providing funding, 
material resources, and “training on Iranian soil.”[8]  
However, insurgent reliance on state support does not come without risks. An external state’s 
motivations are far less rigid, and therefore subject to change depending on the nature of the 
geopolitical considerations at hand. While a state’s motivations can be diverse, they are by no 
means entrenched. While insurgents are well aware of this fact, given that the “donor-client” 
relationship is based solely on the interests of the state, the United States seems to have ignored 
this reality.[9]  
The Geopolitics Behind Iran’s Decision to Support the Iraqi Insurgency  
Increasingly, U.S. policymakers continue to publicly call into question why Iran is supporting the 
Iraqi insurgency. In recent discussions about Iran’s presumed role in Iraqand Afghanistan, 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates commented, “What [Iran’s] motives are other than causing 
trouble for us, I don’t know.”[10] This is by no means a trivial statement. Unlike conventional 
conflicts, the motivations tied to insurgent relationships are of the utmost significance, because 
counterinsurgent success largely depends upon being able to influence these relationships.  
For the counterinsurgent, an understanding of the relationship between insurgents and their 
external state supporters is just as important, because it can be also be exposed under the right 
circumstances. The absence of such an understanding leaves the counterinsurgent in a 
dangerous position—predisposed to a widening the conflict—given the lack of a comprehensive 
strategy for negating this support. This is precisely what the counterinsurgent needs to avoid, if at 
all possible.  
In 2001, RAND conducted a study entitled Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, 
which focused on twelve motivations for different external supporters that might best be grouped 
into three categories: sympathy, aggression, and defensive considerations. The first, sympathy, 
can be based upon of an ideological, ethnic, or religious compatibility with an insurgency. The 
second, aggression, focuses on attempts to garner regional influence or to foster some type of 
self-serving change through insurgent support.[11] It is the third motivation—based on defensive 
considerations—that deserves the most attention, when considering the role of state sponsors.  
When it comes to discussing the role of Iranian support for the Iraqi insurgency, U.S. civilian and 
military leaders often characterize Iranian support as being of a fundamentalist nature, tied to 
either a co-religionist or aggressive narrative. Such a characterization has incited fears about a 
Shia revival throughout the region. U.S. policymakers attributed a similar fundamentalist 
characterization to China’s support for North Vietnam, in which a similar narrative based upon 
ideology and aggression was constructed. Unfortunately, these narratives discount the notion that 
Iran’s role in Iraq, as was China’s role in North Vietnam, is also largely attributable to defensive 
considerations stemming from the role of the counterinsurgent.  
The Counterinsurgent’s Role in Inducing External Insurgent Support 
The impetus for an insurgent-counterinsurgent struggle can vary, depending on the ideological, 
political, or moral context of the situation. But once the conflict is underway, an external state will 
focus on one question: which entity represents a greater threat—the insurgent or the 
counterinsurgent? When facing a threat, Stephan Walt has argued that states are most likely to 
balance against that threat, based upon its power, proximity, and aggression.[12] Within an 
insurgent-counterinsurgent context, we find that counterinsurgents typically poses a greater threat 
to an external states because of their ability to project their military capabilities, in conjunction 
with their proactive efforts to reassert their authority. This is particularly true of a 
counterinsurgency that involves a regional or outside power, as is the case in Iraq. A regional or 
outside power, like the United States, can appear very threatening to a proximate state, given that 
it has already demonstrated the requisite capabilities needed to project its power abroad.  
As was the case during the Vietnam War, China viewed the introduction of U.S. assistance and 
troops as a threat to its national security. Yet, at the time, the United States viewed Chinese 
assistance as offensive in nature, which ultimately resulted in an escalation of the conflict, to 
include the rest of Southeast Asia. As the Vietnam War demonstrated, the consequences of the 
security-insecurity paradox are real.  
A Look Back at the Vietnam War  
Between 1955 and 1965, China supplied North Vietnam with enough weapons and ammunition to 
outfit 230 infantry battalions.[13] As reported years later in China’s Jen Min Jih Pao (The People’s 
Daily), Peking introduced some 320,000 troops into Vietnam over the course of the war, with an 
annual maximum number of troops topping out at 170,000. Most of these troops functioned as 
logistical and support personnel, as well as technical experts. By 1972, China had supplied both 
the DRV and the insurgent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of South Vietnam with 480 122-mm 
howitzers, 2,960 57-mm anti-aircraft guns, and 37,237 mortars.[14] The DRV’s eventual conquest 
of South Vietnam could never have been achieved without the commitment and support of China. 
While the United States and South Vietnam would have had trouble totally eradicating the North 
Vietnamese and the Vietcong resistance movement, the DRV would never have been able to 
achieve total victory without the crucial support that China provided.[15]  
China initially supported North Vietnam against the French for a number of reasons, including 
ideology and regional influence. But on the eve of the Geneva Convention in 1954, China 
became fearful that the “United States might step in [to replace France], thus menacing China on 
its own doorstep.” Suddenly, China’s first priority became its own security. It quickly shifted its 
stance in support of a negotiated settlement that would allow France to maintain some stake in 
Vietnam, in order to prevent the United States from “filling the vacuum left by [a French] 
departure.” Despite its ideological affinity, China proved all too willing to sacrifice the Vietminh 
and their nationalistic aspirations in order to enhance its own security.[16] It was clear that 
China’s first concern was ensuring an agreement that would secure its southern border.  
From China’s perspective, Vietnam, along with Taiwan, were possible locations from where the 
United States might next attempt to initiate direct military hostilities against the Chinese. They 
saw the United States as determined to succeed where they had previously failed (i.e. Korea), 
and feared that a “ring of encirclement,” beginning with Vietnam, could ultimately lead to the end 
of Communist China.[17]  
An honest assessment of the situation in Southeast Asia supports this conclusion: the Korean 
conflict ended in a stalemate in 1953; by 1955 the United States was already preparing to begin 
training South Vietnamese troops. In 1956 President Eisenhower announced that the U.S would 
begin sending American military advisors to South Vietnam; by 1962, the United States 
formalized its escalating commitment to Vietnam by formally establishing the U.S. Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Four years after establishing MACV, the United States 
had 400,000 dedicated combat troops stationed in Vietnam. These successive developments 
only fueled China’s cause for concern.[18] China viewed the continuing escalation as the likely 
precursor for a war between the two adversaries.[19] Thus, the strategic importance of Vietnam 
became the primer for Chinese foreign policy from the late 1950s through the 1970s.[20]  
While the United States publicly announced, as early as February 1965, that it had no desire for 
“a direct confrontation” with China, Chinese officials remained skeptical, and for good reason.[21] 
In 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara sent President Kennedy a memorandum that 
discussed the military decision to bomb North Vietnam. McNamara wrote that this decision was 
built on the need to “contain Communist China.” From the Eisenhower through Johnson 
administrations, nobody seriously considered that China might actually be worried about its own 
security. Instead, each viewed China’s actions as inherently aggressive, built on an ideological 
commitment to the future of communism in Southeast Asia.  
Some thirty years later, McNamara would come to acknowledge the folly behind the once 
prevalent notion that China was bent on establishing a Southeast Asian communist bloc at all 
costs. In his autobiography, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, McNamara 
points out his “totally incorrect appraisal of the ‘Chinese Threat’ to [American] security that 
pervaded [U.S.] thinking.” He goes on to note that, “among other shortcomings, [U.S. 
policymakers] took no account of the centuries-old hostility between China and Vietnam,” 
admitting their “lack of expertise and historical knowledge seriously undermined U.S. policy.”[22]  
China’s post-1954 decision to support the DRV was based primarily on defensive and not 
ideological or aggressive considerations.[23] While China was eager to see its model of 
communism spread throughout Indochina, its primary concern remained its own national security, 
followed by its dominance of the region. China was fearful that an American victory would position 
a hostile U.S. on its Southern doorstep. If America were to succeed, China reasoned that it would 
only be a matter of time before the United States began establishing permanent military bases in 
Vietnam, within striking distance of Beijing. 
Iran’s Role in Iraq  
Turning toward the issue of the day, we often hear of parallels between Vietnam and Iraq. While 
some comparisons are wildly off the mark, others have proven more instructive.[24] Such is the 
case with the role and importance of external state supporters. As was the case in Vietnam, 
external support for the Iraqi insurgents, particularly on a strategic level, has proven deadly.  
There is disagreement concerning what, if any role Iran is playing inside Iraq.[25] Given the 
pretext on which the United States went to war with Iraq—the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction and Saddam’s ties to al-Qaida—the Bush administration’s credibility with 
respect to the intelligence arena has rightly suffered. Suffice to say, while a full understanding of 
Iran’s role in post-Saddam Iraq will not be understood for quite some time, claims regarding their 
entrenched involvement remain highly probable.  
One of the most vociferous arguments made by the United States’ concerns Iran’s supply of 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and similar technological assistance, to elements of the 
Iraqi insurgency. In its findings, the Iraq Study Group also noted, “there are also reports that Iran 
has supplied improvised explosive devices to groups—including Sunni Arab insurgents—that 
attack U.S. forces.”[26] Weapons such as these have contributed to the proficiency with which 
insurgents have been able to attack American forces. As of May 2007, these types of weapons 
were responsible for 38.6 percent of all U.S. casualties.[27] Reports also suggest that other high-
tech weaponry, including mortars and sniper rifles, purchased by Iran, have ended up in the hand 
of Iraqi insurgents.[28] U.S. intelligence officials have been quick to point out that Iran has 
consciously refrained from supplying Shiite militias with more sophisticated weaponry, such as 
the surface-to-air missiles that have been used by Hezbollah against Israel, so as not to provide 
the Bush Administration with any grounds for a direct military response.[29] 
Iran’s Cost Calculus  
After 9/11, the United States faced a monumental decision—where do we go from here. Only 
time will tell if the Bush administration’s approach has made us safer—to date the early returns 
are by no means clear. But what is clear is that by taking a more militant approach against a state 
like Iraq—we put a number of other states, including Iran, on notice.  
After invading Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003, the American military firmly entrenched 
itself on Iran’s Eastern and Western borders. While tensions between the United States and Iran 
have remained volatile since the 1979 Iranian revolution and subsequent U.S. Embassy hostage 
crisis, the Bush administrations increasingly provocative rhetoric (such as Iran’s inclusion in the 
“axis of evil”) has only served to escalate the looming prospect of future hostilities. Add to this 
equation Iran’s ongoing nuclear dispute with the West, and from their perspective, the prospect of 
an imminent attack by the United States (or an ally like Israel) probably seems like an all too real 
possibility. Therefore, given its vulnerable position, it was no surprise to learn that just after the 
United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran attempted to engage the United States in direct talks for 
the first time in over 20 years.  
As first reported by Newsweek magazine in 2007, Switzerland’s Ambassador to Iran at the time, 
Tim Guldimann, sent a fax to the U.S. Department of State which contained a one-page Iranian 
document termed a “roadmap” for comprehensive discussions with the United States on a 
number of high-profile issues. The one-page document was accompanied by a cover letter, in 
which Ambassador Guldimann stated that he “got the clear impression that there is a strong will 
of the [Iranian] regime to tackle the problem with the United States now and to try it with this 
initiative.”[30] According to Guldimann’s letter, the proposal had the approval of Iran’s supreme 
religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s President at the time, Mohammad Khatami, and 
its one-time Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi. It seems readily apparent that Iran was willing to 
make some concessions, probably in exchange for security guarantees. The U.S. never 
responded to this fax.  
In 2007, Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said of the 2003 communiqué, “We 
couldn’t determine what was the Iranian’s and what was the Swiss ambassador’s,” adding that his 
“impression at the time was that the Iranians ‘were trying to put too much on the table.’”[31] 
Newsweek’s Michael Hirsch also reported that Larry Wilkerson, former Secretary of State Colin 
Powell’s chief of staff, said in e-mail that the Iranian overture could have been the beginning of 
“meaningful talks” between the United States and Iran. However, Wilkerson added such a 
proposal “was a non-starter” given Vice President Cheney’s opposition.[32]  
In all likelihood, Iran’s 2003 attempt to open up a dialogue with the United States points to the fact 
that they were likely worried that they might be the next member of the “axis of evil” to suffer a 
preemptive strike, particularly after the United States initially rolled right through the Iraqi army 
with ease. At the same time, the Bush administration was riding high following its display of 
“shock and awe,” and was not interested in any dialogue. Not surprising, as the United States 
spent late 2003 moving to consolidate its hold over Iraq, there were no reports about Iran 
providing support to the Iraqi insurgency. In fact, at the time, Iran even agreed to suspend 
elements of its nuclear program. One can presume that at this point Iran was afraid to play any 
role in fomenting unrest in Iraq for fear that the Bush administration would use any pre-text it 
could to confront Tehran militarily. But as the security situation in the Iraq rapidly deteriorated, it 
seems likely that Iran felt increasing emboldened, and by 2004/05 they were willing to begin 
taking risks in order to help sustain an insurgency that was preoccupying the United States.  
Over the last two plus years, as the balance of power in Iraq has continued to shift, reports 
concerning Iran’s role in Iraq have steadily increased. The emerging success of the Iraqi 
insurgency appears to have given Iran some breathing room. If one is to assume that Iran is 
playing a significant role in the Iraqi insurgency, their actions are likely motivated by an overriding 
desire to bolster their own security vis-à-vis the United States. In 2005, Abbas Milani, Director of 
the Iranian Studies Program at Stanford University, said that it is increasingly obvious that Tehran 
wants to see American troops tied down in Iraq to ensure that a future war with Iran is “simply 
untenable.”[33]  
During this time, the Bush administration has seemingly vacillated between ratcheting up its 
aggressive rhetoric and offering a more conciliatory approach toward Iran. For instance, in March 
2007, the U.S. Navy initiated a major exercise in the Persian Gulf designed to send a message to 
the Iranians, while reassuring “regional audiences” about the capabilities and determination of 
U.S. forces.[34] The timetable for the exercise, which had been previously scheduled, was 
accelerated in part as a response to the Iran’s refusal to curtail its nuclear programs.[35] Two 
months later, while on a visit to the region, Vice President Cheney delivered a speech aboard the 
USS John C. Stennis warning that the “United States was prepared to use its naval power to 
keep Tehran from disrupting oil routes or ‘gaining nuclear weapons and dominating this 
region.’”[36] This defiant message was curiously followed by calls for increased engagement 
between the United States and Iran on the part of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, as well 
as the first instance of direct diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Iran since 
1979.[37]  
Despite some recent indications that it might be willingly to engage Iran on some level, the United 
States’ long-standing track record, coupled with pundit discussions of ‘doubling-down’ on its bet 
to remake Iraq and the greater Middle East, have kept Iran understandingly leery of what a stable 
Iraq could mean for its own future. 
Policy Implications  
It is clear that Iran is not looking to take on the U.S. militarily.  The fact that Tehran has not 
committed to supplying certain types of support to the Iraqi insurgency belies this point.  Iran is 
willing to bear some costs, including the possibility that the United States might take some direct 
action against it, in order to balance against America’s influence in the region.  Iran is chiefly 
concerned with supporting the Iraqi insurgency in order to help bolster its own security, and has 
supported both Sunni and Shiite factions as a result.   
Why does it seem like the United States has neglected to appreciate this motivation with regard 
to Iran?  As was the case in Vietnam, in order to justify continued support, the United States has 
worked to build consensus for the war by framing it as a struggle between good and evil.  While 
this helps to generate support at home, it also fuels a psychological conceptualization of the 
insurgency as ideological, aggressive, and fundamentally committed.  While these motivations 
may certainly be true of many Iraqi insurgents, they do not reflect Iran’s motivations.[38] Yet, by 
conflating the two the United States has absolved itself from having played any part in provoking 
a balancing response from Iran.  
The United States should not rely on the ‘us versus them’ construct, while refusing to consider 
how our actions are being perceived abroad. It is imperative that U.S. policymakers, from the 
administration to the military, develop some self-awareness, and begin to appreciate how our 
actions provoke reactions. This is not to suggest that the United States should acquiesce to Iran’s 
support of the insurgency, or ignore their attempts to develop nuclear weapons. The U.S. must 
appreciate that geopolitical considerations are principally driving these events, and not let our 
emotions get the best of us. The often-mentioned carrot and stick approach has utility, but to 
create meaningful incentives and expectations we must first engage Iran in open and honest 
communication. Dialogue is not a dirty word. Secretary Rice has indicated that the United States 
is willing to directly engage Tehran on some level. This engagement must push forward, and 
comprehensively address a myriad of sensitive issues, including the subject of security 
guarantees. While nuclear and regional concerns are of the utmost importance, it is time the 
United States realized that not every situation must default to a to a zero-sum calculation. The 
fear-mongering allusion to the Munich Agreement has lost its utility—the United States must 
begin to reaffirm a return to realism before we find ourselves on the verge of a wider conflict. 
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